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INTRODUCTION
Circuit courts are split over the interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 1920(4),
which addresses shifting of electronic discovery (“e-discovery”) costs at
Although the statute lists “copies” and
the end of the trial.1
“exemplification” as taxable expenses, federal courts of appeals and
district courts interpret these words differently, with drastically differing
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1 The relevant part of the statute states: “A judge or clerk of any court of the United
States may tax as costs the following . . . [F]ees for exemplification and the costs of making
copies of any materials where the copies are necessarily obtained for use in the case.” 28
U.S.C. § 1920(4) (2014).
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The expense of discovery is
effects on the allocation of costs.2
presumptively borne by the responding party,3 but under the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”), parties can petition for relief from ediscovery requests creating undue burden or expense.4 Courts are also
required to limit discovery where possible,5 and, under Rule 54 of the
FRCP, there is a presumption in favor of the award of costs to the
prevailing party.6
The federal statute focuses on the post litigation stage and does not
refer to any agreements between the parties at the pre-trial stage.7 Courts
have split over what types of electronically stored information (“ESI”) are

2 Compare Race Tires Am., Inc. v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp., 674 F.3d 158, 169 (3d
Cir. 2012) (“The result does not depend upon whether the activities leading up to the
making of copies are performed by third party consultants with technical expertise. As
expressed by one court, ‘Section 1920(4) speaks narrowly of [f]ees for exemplification and
copies of papers, suggesting that fees are permitted only for the physical preparation and
duplication of documents, not the intellectual effort involved in their production’”)
(quoting Romero v. City of Pomona, 883 F.2d 1418, 1428 (9th Cir.1989)); with Hecker v.
Deere & Co., 556 F.3d 575, 591 (7th Cir. 2009), (awarding one of the defendants
$164,814.43 in costs for “converting computer data into a readable format in response to
plaintiffs’ discovery requests”) and U.S. Bankr. v. Dorel Indus., No. A-08-CA-354, 2010
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78096, at *13–14 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 2, 2010) (awarding the defendant
$27,171.88 under 28 U.S.C. § 1920(3) for the creation of an electronic database that
managed 800,000 pages of emails).
3 See Oppenheimer Fund v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 358 (1978) (“[A] rough analogy
might usefully be drawn to practice under the discovery rules. Under those rules, the
presumption is that the responding party must bear the expense of complying with discovery
requests.”); see also Adrian K. Felix, E-Discovery, Shifting the Costs of Compliance,
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/young_lawyers/publications/the_101_201_practice_series/
e_discovery_ shifting_the_costs_of_compliance.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2015) (“The general
presumption is that the responding party will bear the costs of compliance with e-discovery
requests.”).
4 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B).
5 FED. R. C IV. P. 26 (b)(2)(C) (“[T]he court must limit the frequency or extent of
discovery . . . if it determines that: (i) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or
duplicative, or can be obtained from some other source that is more convenient, less
burdensome, or less expensive; (ii) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity
to obtain the information by discovery in the action; or (iii) the proposed discovery is
outside the scope permitted by R. 26(b)(1).”); FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (“Unless otherwise
limited by court order, the scope of discovery is as follows: Parties may obtain discovery
regarding any non-privileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and
proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in
the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant information,
the parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether
the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.”).
6 FED. R. CIV. P. 54(d) (“Unless a federal statute, these rules, or a court order provides
otherwise, costs-other than attorney’s fees-should be allowed to the prevailing party.”).
7 28 U.S.C. § 1920(6) (referring only to papers filed at the end of the case: “A bill of
costs shall be filed in the case and, upon allowance, included in the judgment or decree”).
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taxable and how much e-discovery is recoverable.8 The divergent
opinions create unfair results for parties who are unable to recover the
often prohibitive costs of that initially granted discovery.9 Uncertainty
about the final costs of ESI threatens to deter litigants from pursuing a case
and to push parties to settle early, regardless of the case’s merits.10 These
outcomes are at odds with the American legal system’s goals of predictable
outcomes, fairness in the litigation process, and equal access to litigation
for all parties.11
Parties decide what kind of e-discovery and how much e-discovery
they pursue under the FRCP, but the court determines what costs are
recoverable under 28 U.S.C. § 1920(4).12 The court’s role would be more
effective if it enforced what the parties themselves agree to in e-discovery.
8 Michael D. Berman, Taxation of E-Discovery Costs Under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1920(4)
after Taniguchi v. Kan Pacific Saipan, A.B.A.J. (August 14, 2012), http://www.esimediation.com/taxation-of-e-discovery-costs-under-28-u-s-c-sec-19204-after-taniguchiv-kan-pacific-saipan// (“Nevertheless, courts have split on which e-discovery costs may be
awarded to a prevailing party under 28 U.S.C. §1920(4).”).
9 M. Austrian, Taxation of Costs and Offer of Judgment, DRI (June, 2012),
http://dritoday.org/ftd/2012-06F.pdf/13 (suggesting use of an offer of judgment to pursue
a request for costs and noting “[a]n enormous divergence of opinion” among the courts,
“with outcomes that range from almost complete reimbursement to total denial”); see
generally S. Bennett, Are E-Discovery Costs Recoverable by a Prevailing Party?, 20 ALB.
L.J. SCI. & TECH. 537 (2010).
10 Jon Kyl, A Rare Chance to Lower Litigation Costs, W ALL ST . J. (Jan. 20, 2014, 6:21
PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304049704579321003417505882.
Kyl points out that the cost of, when not specifically allocated to the requesting party, can
lead to a form of effective litigation bullying: “A federal committee wants to hear your ideas
on the subject. Speak up. Nothing provokes as much dread in the mind of a CEO or general
counsel as the words, ‘We’ve been sued in federal court.’ Once they hear an estimate of the
litigation costs, many executives say, ‘I don’t care if we’re right, settle the case.’” Id.
11 See Shelley Podolny, Opinion, The Digital Pileup, N.Y. TIMES (March 12, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/ 2011/03/13/opinion/13podolny.html (“[L]arge corporations face
eye-popping litigation costs when they search for information that may be evidence in a
lawsuit-so called e-discovery-that can add up to millions of dollars a year . . . the costs of
can be crushing”); see also AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR JUSTICE, What We Do:
Advocate for the Civil Justice System, https://www.justice.org/what-we-do/advocate-civiljustice-system (last visited March 13, 2015).
12 See FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a)(1)(A) (“Any designated documents or electronically stored
information—including writings, drawings, graphs, charts, photographs, sound recordings,
images, and other data or data compilations—stored in any medium from which
information can be obtained either directly or, if necessary, after translation by the
responding party into a reasonably usable form.”); but see 28 U.S.C. §1920(4) (referencing
six specific types of fees that may be taxed: “(1) Fees of the clerk and marshal; (2) Fees for
printed or electronically recorded transcripts necessarily obtained for use in the case; (3)
Fees and disbursements for printing and witnesses; (4) Fees for exemplification and the
costs of making copies of any materials where the copies are necessarily obtained for use in
the case; (5) Docket fees under section 1923 of this title; (6) Compensation of court
appointed experts, compensation of interpreters, and salaries, fees, expenses, and costs of
special interpretation services under section 1828 of this title”).
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Amending the FRCP and the U.S.C. to make discovery settlements binding
and create a cost sharing process that reflects parties’ own agreements on
discovery,13 is a practical solution that would reduce surprises and enhance
fairness.
This paper will examine the current state of cost shifting of fees
associated with discovery in the post litigation context in federal courts
and argue that the divergent results in current holdings warrant a novel
approach with more court supervision or otherwise binding rulings on cost
sharing of e-discovery throughout the litigation. Section I gives a brief
overview of the history of discovery issues relevant to the e-discovery
debate. Section II provides an analysis of the major cases and trends in
the circuit split on the taxing of e-discovery costs. Section III examines
the rules and policies pertinent to this debate currently reflected in the
FRCP and the U.S.C. Section IV analyzes approaches to amending the
rules that would provide more clarity. Section V examines the suggested
rule changes for e-discovery that various legal bodies have suggested.
Section VI recommends solutions that address the legal and policy
considerations discussed in the paper. Finally, the conclusion summarizes
the issues and recommendations.
I.

HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF DISCOVERY ISSUES
RELEVANT TO E-DISCOVERY

Discovery, in particular electronic discovery (“e-discovery”), has
broadened over time.14 The discovery process is more complex, and

13 See FED. R. CIV. P. 16(f) ((1) In General. On motion or on its own, the court may
issue any just orders, including those authorized by Rule 37(b) (2) (A) (ii)–(vii), if a party
or its attorney: (A) fails to appear at a scheduling or other pretrial conference; (B) is
substantially unprepared to participate–—or does not participate in good faith–—in the
conference; or (C) fails to obey a scheduling or other pretrial order.”).
14 See generally Michael Junk & John McNulty, Leveling the Playing Field; Recouping
e-Discovery Costs As Part of the Taxable Costs Awarded to Prevailing Parties ties Under
28 U.S.C. § 1920(4), PRODUCT LIABILITY LAW & STRATEGY (Law Journal
Newsletter, Philadelphia, PA.), April 1, 2012, at *1, available at
http://www.lawjournalnewsletters.com/issues/ljn_prodliability/30_10/news/1564901.html (“Document production: What once consisted of collecting a few hardcopy files
from a relatively short list of ‘key’ custodians now typically requires the retention of
litigation-support specialists to accomplish not only the imaging and production of
hardcopy files, but also the identification, extraction and production of relevant
electronically stored information (ESI) from computers, databases, servers, and even
disaster recovery systems. The age of ESI changed everything in terms of how quickly and
easily documents are created and then stored. As a consequence, every corporate defendant
in a product liability case today can expect to spend thousands-if not hundreds of thousandsof dollars producing documents in discovery. Indeed, it is hardly an overstatement to say
that discovery costs are staggering.”).
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consequently more expensive, in cases requiring e-discovery.15 Although
courts or parties can restrict discovery, this is not a satisfactory solution, as there
may be information of great value to the case that can only be discovered
by looking at a large number of data points. E-discovery encompasses
more sources than traditional discovery does; e-discovery includes: audio
files, emails, social media postings, other forms of communication, and
recordings of dealings and transactions that are relevant to the issues in the
case.16 Dr. D. Michael Risinger noted in his article, Wolves, Sheep,
Predators and Scavengers, that the purpose of promulgating the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure was to enhance access to the courts,17 and that
one of the first proposed changes to the rules was to narrow the scope of
permissible discovery and mandate a discovery conference.18 The
proliferation of e-discovery, in contrast, pushes in the opposite direction.
E-discovery differs from traditional discovery not only in terms of
the actual rules that are applied, but also in its process and its cost.19 The
Southern District of New York case, Pippins v. KPMG, demonstrates both
of these aspects. In that case, the court denied KPMG’s motion to maintain
only a representative sampling of its hard drives when served with a
discovery order.20 The court applied traditional discovery rules to allow
discovery of all relevant information, failing to account for the enormous
number of hard drives that had to be accessed in order for the corporation
to comply. 21 KPMG also implemented the traditional “American Rule”
that each party pays its own costs in discovery.22 The American Rule is

15 See id. (“According to one recent survey, for the period 2006-2008, the average
company paid average discovery costs per case of $621,880 to $2,993,567. Companies at
the high end [of the scale] during the same time periods reported average per-case discovery
costs ranging from $2,354,868 to $9,759,900.”).
16 See id.
17 D. Michael Risinger, Wolves and Sheep, Predators and Scavengers, or Why I Left
Civil Procedure (Not With a Bang, But a Whimper), 60 UCLA L. REV. 1620, 1645–46 (2013)
(“We have a right to a thrilling moment of self-congratulation as we contemplate the fact
that in our federal courts we have come closer to making a reality of the right to equality
before the law . . . . The Federal Rules swung the courthouse door wide open.”) (quoting
Jack B. Weinstein, The Ghost of Process Past: The Fiftieth Anniversary of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and Erie, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 3, 24–26 (1988)).
18 Id. at 1639–40 (“The most radical proposal was to change the language of Rule 26
with the intent to narrow the scope of discovery (and perhaps indirectly raise the amount of
detail required of pleadings). The recommendations also included provisions for a
mandatory discovery conference[.]”)
19 See Junk & McNulty, supra note 14, at *1.
20 Pippins v. KPMG LLP, No. 11 Civ. 0377 (CM)(JLC), 2011 WL 4701849, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 2011), aff’d., 279 F.R.D. 245, 253 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
21 Id.
22 See, e.g., Marie Gryphon, Assessing the Effects of a ‘Loser Pays’ Rule on the
American Legal System: An Economic Analysis and Proposal for Reform, 8 RUTGERS J.L.
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well established as a uniform approach to encourage litigants to proceed
without fear of cost shifting.23 But there is a huge increase in both the
complexity of the process and the cost required to comply with its
demands.24 In KPMG, the cost of preserving, producing and processing
the data requested was $21 million.25 Therefore, simply adopting the
American Rule cannot be a satisfactory solution.
The KPMG discovery ruling has led commentators to point out that
cases are settled early for more than they are worth.26 Charles Fax notes
in his article, A Trend Towards Cost Shifting in Discovery:
The warnings of pro-business groups like the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce that the KPMG ruling could encourage overly aggressive
discovery requests and force inequitable settlements—hyperbole aside—
are not far-fetched. The KPMG ruling is consistent with a large body of
case law. This seems paradoxical because the discovery rules authorize
courts to require cost-sharing where circumstances warrant. Rule 26(c)
permits a court, for good cause, to impose conditions on discovery,
including, according to the advisory notes, “payment by the requesting
party of part or all of the reasonable costs of obtaining information from
sources that are not reasonably accessible.”27
At the other extreme end of the spectrum of e-discovery rulings,
courts deny e-discovery altogether.28 In United States v. University of
Nebraska at Kearney, the Nebraska District Court denied the plaintiff’s
motion to compel e-discovery based on their proposed search terms,
effectively leading to no e-discovery.29 The magistrate judge in that case
& PUB. POL’Y 567, 567–68 (2011) (discussing the “American Rule” and explaining that
parties pay their own costs under this rule).
23 Charles Fax, A Trend Towards Cost Shifting in Discovery, A.B.A. LITIGATION
http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/litigationnews/civil_procedure/
NEWS (2013),
051013-cost-shifting-discovery.html (last visited March 5, 2015) (“The American Rule is
rooted in the belief that injured parties might not bring meritorious suits for fear of losing
and incurring liability for the defendant’s legal fees, even if that risk is slight. At best,
plaintiffs might settle for less than fair value in an arms-length negotiation. Public interest
suits might disappear. Thus, the belief holds, the American Rule promotes the ends of
justice.”).
24 See Junk & McNulty, supra note 14, at *1.
25 KPMG, 2011 WL 4701849, at *1.
26 See Kyl, supra note 10.
27 See Fax, supra note 23.
28 See, e.g., United States v. Univ. of Neb., No. 4:11CV3209, 2014 WL 4215381, (D.
Neb. Aug. 25, 2014), at *7 (“Having considered the allegations and docket filings, and
absent any evidence that the defendants hid or destroyed discovery and cannot be trusted to
comply with written discovery requests, the court is convinced ESI is neither the only nor
the best and most economical discovery method for obtaining the information the
government seeks. Standard document production requests, interrogatories, and
depositions should suffice—and with far less cost and delay.”) (emphasis added).
29 Id. at *1.
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allowed only traditional discovery tools and denied e-discovery
altogether.30 This response to the cost issue at stake in e-discovery missed
several aspects of the debate, which could lead to an impeding effect on
future litigation.31 Most cases today probably require some degree of ediscovery because most files are stored electronically and most
communication is done via electronic means such as e-mail. E-discovery
can be an efficient tool: professionals trained in appropriate search
techniques can conduct narrow searches, thus allowing lower-cost
discovery over a broader scope of searchable material.
Turning back the clock to traditional discovery techniques ignores
the reality of daily filing and communication techniques. It also limits the
scope of discoverable material by disallowing search term based sweeps
of electronic files. In the University of Nebraska case, the court noted the
key problems with the e-discovery requests at issue were not the costs per
se, but the parties’ failure to persuade the court as to cost allocation.32
II. CIRCUIT SPLIT
The history of the circuit split demonstrates that courts have been
aware of the costs associated with e-discovery and that cost shifting may
be necessary. The 2002 case, Rowe Entertainment v. William Morris
Agency, set the guidelines for future decisions by noting the excessively
high costs of e-discovery and creating an eight-factor test for
consideration in the cost shifting issue.33 The decision in Zubulake v. UBS
Warburg LLC modified this test, favoring cost shifting and giving the most
weight to the first two Rowe factors, dropping one factor, and weighting
the rest in descending order.34 The factors as modified are:
1. The extent to which the request is specifically tailored to discover
relevant information;
2. The availability of such information from other sources;

30

United States v. Univ. of Neb., 4:11CV3209 (Dist. Neb. Aug. 5, 2014).
See United States v. Univ. of Neb., No. 4:11CV3209, 2013 WL 2146049, at *4–5
(D. Neb. May 15, 2013) (referring only to the relevancy standard as limiting the scope of
permissible discovery).
32 See id. at *5–6 (noting that it was “(i) the failure of the government to provide a costbenefit analysis or a ‘sound articulation’ of how this cost was required to comply with the
plaintiff’s demands, (ii) the plaintiff’s failure to suggest reasonable cost allocation or to
show a ‘reasonable likelihood of uncovering relevant or admissible evidence’; (iii) the
overly broad nature of the scope of production in the government’s request for comparator
evidence Act, which raised privacy concerns for parties unrelated to the lawsuit”).
33 Rowe Entm’t, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, 205 F.R.D. 421, 425–26, 429
(S.D.N.Y. 2002).
34 Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309, 322–324 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
31
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3. The total cost of production, compared to the amount in
controversy;
4. The total cost of production, compared to the resources available
to each party;
5. The relative ability of each party to control costs and its incentive
to do so;
6. The importance of the issues at stake in the litigation;
7. The relative benefits to the parties of obtaining the information.35
The Zubulake court also recommended the initial use of a data sample
to determine whether the information in electronically stored format
would be likely to promote the issues to be explored in the litigation.36
In 2008, Congress amended the federal statute, which had previously
only allowed for costs of “exemplification and copies of papers,” to
include fees for “exemplification and the costs of making copies of any
materials where the copies are necessarily obtained for use in the case.”37
Courts are split over whether electronic document production for review
is a necessity or a mere convenience for opposing counsel; the Federal and
Seventh Circuits held that it is a necessity.38
By contrast, the Third Circuit held in Race Tires America, Inc. v.
Hoosier Racing Tire Corp. that 28 U.S.C. § 1920(4) only applied to the
“scanning of hard documents, the conversion of native files to Tagged
Image File Format (TIFF), and the transfer of VHS tapes to DVD.”39
After the Race Tires decision, the prevailing party filed a petition for
certiorari in 2012, asking the Supreme Court to define the scope of
recoverable costs in the electronic document production context. The
Court denied certiorari, leaving the present confusion.40
The change in approach to this issue was reflected in the Fourth
Circuit’s decision in Country Vintner of North Carolina, LLC v. E. & J.
Gallo Winery Inc., which limited “copying” to exclude almost all ESI
charges.41 The Fourth Circuit held that the prevailing defendant could
only recover fees from file conversion and transferring files onto discs,
35

See id. at 322.
See id. at 324.
37 28 U.S.C. § 1920 (4).
38 See Ricoh Co. v. AMI Semiconductor, 661 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (holding that
the Cost Statute extends to “all costs producing a document electronically”); Hecker v.
Deere & Co., 556 F.3d 575 (7th Cir. 2009) (holding that the award of almost $165,000 in
costs associated with selection and conversion of ESI was allowed).
39 Race Tires Am., Inc. v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp., 674 F.3d 158, 171 (3d Cir. 2012).
40 Hoosier Racing Tire Corp. v. Race Tires Am., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 233 (2012).
41 Country Vintner of N.C., LLC v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, Inc., 718 F.3d 249, 260 (4th
Cir. 2013) (following the Third Circuit in Race Tires).
36
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resulting in the requested $111,000 fees dropping to $218.00.42 The
Country Vintner court disallowed costs for: flattening and indexing, ESI,
searching and data extraction, managing the processing of ESI, and
preparing for production of documents to opposing counsel.43 The
Country Vintner decision reflects the trend in Race Tires, which started the
new move away from broad recovery of costs in e-discovery.44 The court
in Country Vintner used the same reasoning as the Race Tires court, noting
“a prevailing party may recover costs associated with copying or
duplicating its files, but it may not receive reimbursement for any other
ESI related expenses.45
In May 2012, the Supreme Court in Taniguchi v. Kan Pacific Saipan
held that 28 U.S.C. § 1920(6) prohibited the prevailing defendant from
recovering as “interpreter” costs those that were associated with
translating documents.46 This literal reading of the statute seems to
indicate how the Supreme Court would rule if it chose to grant certiorari
on the question of “exemplification” and “copying” under 28 U.S.C.
§1920(4).47
The Fourth Circuit in Country Vintner referenced the Taniguchi
decision and the Race Tires decision, noting:
We find the Third Circuit’s reasoning persuasive. The court properly
took into account the statute’s history, its plain language, and the Supreme
Court’s narrow contemporary interpretation of the costs taxable under
§ 1920. [T]hese considerations support the conclusion that . . . subsection
(4) limits taxable costs to . . . converting electronic files to non-editable
formats, and burning the files onto discs.48

42

Id. at 261 (agreeing with the District Court’s reduction in fees.).
Country Vintner of N.C., LLC v. E & J Gallo Winery, Inc., No. 5:09-CV-326-BR,
2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108905, at *5 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 3, 2012).
44 Race Tires, 674 F.3d at 171 (“Here, neither Hoosier nor DMS obtained a costshifting protective order. We are consequently limited to shifting only those costs explicitly
enumerated in § 1920 . . . [W]e conclude that of the numerous services the vendors
performed, only the scanning of hard copy documents, the conversion of native files to
TIFF, and the transfer of VHS tapes to DVD involved ‘copying,’ and that the costs
attributable to only those activities are recoverable under § 1920(4)’s allowance for the
‘costs of making copies of any materials.’”).
45 Country Vintner, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108905, at *8.
46 Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd., 132 S. Ct. 1997, 1998, 2000 (2012) (holding that
a “plain language” narrow meaning of the word “interpreter” meant that only oral
interpretation costs and not document translation could be recovered).
47 See 28 U.S.C. §1920(4).
48 Country Vintner of N.C., LLC v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, Inc., 718 F.3d 249, 260 (4th
Cir. 2013).
43
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But not all courts are narrowing the recovery of e-discovery costs.49
In February 2013, a U.S. district judge in San Diego awarded $2.8 million
in attorneys’ fees to the prevailing defendant, Qualcomm, for costs
incurred in performing predictive coding.50 This decision suggests that the
way that parties frame their e-discovery costs may affect the court’s view
of whether they are recoverable.51
III. RELEVANT RULES
Judge Scheindlin significantly noted, “in an era where vast amounts
of electronic information is available for review, discovery in certain cases
has become increasingly complex and expensive.”52 The general rule in
discovery is that the party producing requested documents shoulders the
burden of the cost.53 But under FRCP 26(b)(2)(B), if the requested party
can show that the e-discovery is not “reasonably accessible because of
undue burden or cost,” 54 the requesting party must show good cause for
production.55 In this case, the discovery need only be identified and not
produced.56 At the end of the litigation, courts generally grant costs, other
than attorneys’ fees, to the prevailing party under FRCP 54(d). That is,
“unless a federal statute, these rules [FRCP], or a court order provides
otherwise.”57 The nature of the exact costs that can be shifted is not
entirely clear due to courts’ different interpretations of “copies” and
“exemplification” under the federal statute.58 There is currently a circuit
split in the interpretation of 28 U.S.C. §1920(4) regarding the nature of
taxable costs to the losing party in the electronic production setting.59 The
49 See Ricoh Co. v. AMI Semiconductor, 661 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (holding that
the Cost Statute extends to “all costs producing a document electronically”); Hecker v.
Deere & Co., 556 F.3d 575 (7th Cir. 2009) (holding that the award of almost $165,000 in
costs associated with selection and conversion of ESI was allowed).
50 Gabriel Techs. Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., No. 08cv1992 AJB (MDD), 2013 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 14105 *35 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 1, 2013) (“[T]he Court finds Cooley’s decision to
undertake a more efficient and less time-consuming method of document review to be
reasonable under the circumstances. In this case, the nature of Plaintiffs’ claims resulted in
significant discovery and document production, and Cooley seemingly reduced the overall
fees and attorney hours required by performing electronic document review at the outset.
Thus, the Court finds the requested amount of $2,829,349.10 to be reasonable.”).
51 See id.
52 Pension Comm. of the Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of Am. Sec. LLC, 685
F. Supp. 2d 456, 461 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
53 See sources cited supra note 3.
54 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B).
55 Id.
56 See id.
57 FED. R. CIV. P. 54(d).
58 28 U.S.C.S. § 1920(4) (2014).
59 Compare Romero v. City of Pomona, 883 F.2d 1418, 1428 (9th Cir.1989) (taking a
narrow view of allowable costs), with Hecker v. Deere & Co., 556 F.3d 575, 591 (7th Cir.
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statute states that the court may tax “[f]ees for exemplification and the
costs of making copies of any materials where the copies are necessarily
obtained for use in the case.”60 Attorney fees may also be awarded,
however, they are not covered by § 1920.61
“Taxing” refers to shifting some of the costs to the losing party at the
end of the litigation. A recent trend to narrow or fully restrict the shifting
of electronic production costs has emerged. The Federal Circuit, for
example, has read “exemplification” to mean an official transcript of a
public record that has been authenticated for use as evidence.62 As
recently as February 2015, the Ninth Circuit, in Resnick v. Netflix, Inc.,
held that only the cost of copies necessarily obtained for use in the case,
but not those obtained for the lawyer’s convenience, were taxable.63 But
the Seventh Circuit saw the term “exemplification” as including a “wide
Nevertheless, after
variety of exhibits and demonstrative aids.”64
Taniguchi, federal courts of appeals generally follow a narrow reading of
costs and exemplification.65
Some academics propose that the Taniguchi approach should be
universally adopted in cost shifting decisions.66 At the demand stage, it
is common to grant broader access to electronically stored material than
traditional discovery allows for hard copy.67 Consequently, preservation
of electronic data is recommended, especially where there are policy
2009) (awarding costs to defendant in the amount of $164,814.43) and Cefalu v. Vill. of
Elk Grove, 211 F.3d 416, 428 (7th Cir. 2000) (finding “no limits inherent in the term
exemplification that would . . . preclude [a court] from compensating a party
for . . . computer-based, multimedia displays,” and that “[t]his approach allows appropriate
room for the more sophisticated types of multi-media presentations made possible by
technological advances”).
60 See supra note 1 (noting the types of awards that may be made under 28 U.S.C.S.
§ 1920(4)).
61 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b)–(c) (2006) (awarding attorney and expert fees in civil
rights cases).
62 See Kohus v. Cosco, Inc., 282 F.3d 1355, 1360–61 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (noting that 6th
and 11th Circuit precedent indicates that video costs would not be recoverable).
63 Resnick v. Netflix, Inc. (In re Online DVD-Rental Antitrust Litig.), 779 F.3d 914,
930 (9th Cir. 2015) (stating that “the ability to conduct the review by looking at the original
document establishes that the uploaded copy was not necessarily obtained for use in the
case . . . . Accordingly, these charges are non-taxable under [28 U.S.C] § 1920(4)”).
64 See Cefalu v. Vill. of Elk Grove, 211 F.3d 416, 427 (7th Cir. 2000).
65 See Country Vintner of N.C., LLC v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, Inc., 718 F.3d 249, 260
(4th Cir. 2013) and sources cited supra, notes 44, 45 and 59.
66 See, e.g., Emily Overfield, Shifting the E-Discovery Solution: Why Taniguchi
Necessitates a Decline in E- Discovery Court Costs, 118 PENN ST. L. REV. 217, 234
(2013); Preston Register, How Much Do I Owe You For That Copy? Defining Awards
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1920 (4), 65 ALA. L. REV. 1087, 1106 (2014).
67 See Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309, 321 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“[I]f a
case has the potential for broad public impact, then public policy weighs heavily in favor of
permitting extensive discovery.”).
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interests at stake. The amount of discoverable ESI material that parties are
requesting is exponentially larger than that requested under traditional
discovery.68 For many years, the legal community has noted with
increasing alarm the nature of ESI as involving both great quantity and
costs.69 ESI is more voluminous than hard copy, is not automatically
erased even when deleted, and can be searched in many more ways and
places than paper documents.70 E-discovery now includes:
[1] voice mail;
[2] e-mail;
[3] deleted e-mail;
[4] data files;
[5] program files;
[6] back-up files;
[7] archival tapes;
[8] temporary files;
[9] system history files;
[10] web site information in textual, graphical or audio format;
[11] web site files;
[12] cache files;
[13] “cookies” and other electronically stored information.71
The circuit split reflects the varying approaches taken by state and
district courts. Courts, following the FRCP, or similar state rules, may
grant broad motions to compel production of all ESI documents that are
likely to be relevant to the litigation.72 But some district courts are starting
to restrict or altogether disallow these requests in order to limit cost.73 The
68

See Junk & McNulty, supra note 14, at *1.
See, e.g., Podolny, supra note 11.
70 See Thompson v. U.S. Dep’t of Housing and Urban Dev., 219 F.R.D. 93, 97 (D. Md.
2003) (“[S]ince ‘deleting’ electronic records does not actually result in their instantaneous
erasure, but rather simply designates the file as ‘not used,’ thereby enabling the computer to
write over it, courts have ruled that Rule 34 requests seeking ‘deleted’ electronic records
are permissible.”) (internal citation omitted).
71 James W. McElhaney, Channeling Discovery, A.B.A.J., (November 2004),
http://www.abajournal.com/ magazine/article/channeling_discovery.
72 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (“Unless otherwise limited by court order, the scope of
discovery is as follows: Parties may obtain discovery regarding any non-privileged matter
that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense . . . relevant information need not be
admissible at the trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence.”) (emphasis added).
73 See D.C.G. Sys., Inc. v. Checkpoint Techs., No. C-11-03792 PSG, 2011 WL 5244356
at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2011). Magistrate Judge Grewel used a model rule developed by
the Federal Rules Advisory Comm. to address a “largely unchecked problem.” Id. The same
judge later ruled in another case to limit search terms used in recovering relevant ESI in order
69
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results therefore lack uniformity, and parties are at the mercy of the courts’
discretion.74 Legal professionals predict that “[i]f counsel and parties do
not manage e-discovery effectively, courts will take control of these issues
[and] fundamentally change the way we litigate.”75
Many advocates in legal practice are coming together to demand
clearer rules in this rapidly changing area, both at the cost shifting and the
demand stages. For example, in a recent law review article, Overfield
requests that the Supreme Court articulate and mandate a test to clarify the
scope of the terms “copying” and “exemplification.”76 But Overfield’s
approach is limited to the notion of simply restricting recovery of ediscovery costs in all cases.77 This fails to take into account those cases
where large costs may have been necessary as well as proportionate to the
issues in the case.78 Overfield argues that costs should be restricted under
a narrow interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 1920(4).79 A universal approach
that is based on a narrow reading of 28 U.S.C. § 1920(4) may initially seem
like a satisfying solution, but this leaves out the parties and their
agreements and gives all the power to the courts.80 A recent tax court
decision, Dynamo Holdings Ltd. Partnership v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, notes that parties should not delegate the execution of the ediscovery process to the courts because:
[T]he Court is not normally in the business of dictating to parties the
process that they should use when responding to discovery. If our focus
were on paper discovery, we would not (for example) be dictating to a
party the manner in which it should review documents for responsiveness
or privilege, such as whether that review should be done by a paralegal, a
junior attorney, or a senior attorney. Yet that is, in essence, what the parties

to address the “crushing burdens imposed on both the parties and the court by cases of this
type.” Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs., Co., No. C 11-1846 LHK (PSG), 2012 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 9921 *43–44 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2012).
74 Steven Williams, Limit E-Discovery or the Courts Will, CAL. LAWYER 61, 62
(Apr. 2012), http://callawyer.com/ Clstory.cfm? eid=921396&wteid=921396_Limit_E Discovery,_or_the_Courts_Will.
75 See id.
76 See Overfield, supra note 66, at 233.
77 See id. at 225.
78 See Overfield, supra note 76. Overfield does not address the issue of necessarily
large costs or their relationship to the issues in the case.
79 See id.
80 See id. at 235–36 (recommending that courts follow the Seventh Circuit’s
interpretation of exemplification in United States v. Cefalu 338 F.2d 582 (7th Cir. 1964)
(adopting a “necessity” standard for reimbursing costs of copies and interpreting the
“reasonably necessary” language of the statute to mean that the copy must be “vital to the
presentation of the information”)).
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are asking the Court to consider–whether document review should be done
by humans or with the assistance of computers.81
It is more practical, therefore, to amend the FRCP and the U.S.C. to
make discovery settlements binding, and create a cost sharing process that
reflects parties’ own agreements on discovery.82 This would reduce
surprises and enhance fairness.
IV. APPROACHES TO RULE CHANGES
One possible approach to the problems discussed above would be to
amend FRCP Rule 34 to specifically delineate what kinds of electronic
format are permissible. Currently, the request may be for any format that
is reasonable.83 This list could be amended to indicate exactly what
formats are reasonable, as well as what specific methods of copying and
exemplifying these materials would be allowed.84 This list would thus
specify what is a copy and what is exemplification for purposes of
litigation, such that interpreting the language of the federal cost shifting
statute at the end of litigation would be permissible.85
Such an approach would clarify when courts can shift costs.86 Currently,
federal courts can allocate costs to the requesting party under Rules
81

Dynamo Holdings L.P. v. Comm’r, 143 T.C. 183, 189 (2014).
See FED. R. CIV. P. 16 advisory committee’s notes to 1993 amendment (“However,
in other respects particularly with regard to case management, the rule has not always been
as helpful as it might have been. Thus there has been a widespread feeling that amendment
is necessary to encourage pretrial management that meets the needs of modern litigation.
Major criticism of Rule 16 has centered on the fact that its application can result in overregulation of some cases and under-regulation of others. In simple, run-of-the-mill cases,
attorneys have found pretrial requirements burdensome. It is claimed that overadministration leads to a series of mini-trials that result in a waste of an attorney’s time and
needless expense to a client. This is especially likely to be true when pretrial proceedings
occur long before trial. At the other end of the spectrum, the discretionary character of Rule
16 and its orientation toward a single conference late in the pretrial process has led to underadministration of complex or protracted cases. Without judicial guidance beginning shortly
after institution, these cases often become mired in discovery.”) (emphasis added) (citing
Nat’l Comm’n for the Review of Antitrust Laws and Procedures, Report to the President
and the Attorney General (1979) and Pollack, Pretrial Procedures More Effectively
Handled, 65 F.R.D. 475 (1974)).
83 See FED. R. CIV. P. 34 (a party may “serve on any other party a request that is within
the scope of Rule 26(b): (A) any designated documents or electronically stored
information–—including writings, drawings, graphs, charts, photographs, sound
recordings, images, and other data or data compilations–—stored in any medium from
which information can be obtained either directly or, if necessary, after translation by the
responding party into a reasonably usable form”).
84 See FED. R. CIV. P. 34.
85 See id. Additions to the list could include what forms of technology are acceptable to
be produced and what methods of copying could be reasonable.
86 See 28 U.S.C. §1920(4) (2015). There is no list of what qualifies as copying or
exemplification under the statute.
82
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37(a)(5)(B4)(b) and 26(c) when the other party can show the information
Some legal professionals advocate
is not reasonably accessible.87
expanding this authority to make all costs go to the requesting party.88 But
simply moving the cost allocation to the requesting party in all cases would
lead to inequity in some cases, such as those of pro se litigants trying to
find evidence for their own appeals. 89
The FRCP was amended in 2006 to address the issues of e-discovery;
these changes went into effect on December 1, 2006. The amendments
pertain to the planning and managing of discovery and the regulating of
privilege and imposing of sanctions.90 They do not directly address the
issue of cost shifting after litigation.91 Parties should be fully aware in
advance of the consequences of their behavior with regard to ESI for
recovery of costs after trial. For these reasons, the rules should be
amended. Furthermore, the term “reasonably accessible” in Rule 26(b)(2)
should be clearly defined instead of being left open to the courts to
interpret, as should the term “good cause.”92
Rules on sanctions in e-discovery are particularly important to the
issue of cost shifting and in the failure of production. The most dramatic
example here is that of the Florida state court award of $1.45 million based
on ESI sanctions in Coleman Holdings, Inc. v. Morgan Stanley & Co.,
Inc.93 Rule 37(e) addresses bad faith requirements in its “safe-harbor”
provision, which disallows courts from imposing sanctions for failure to
87

See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(5)(B)–(C).
See Kyl supra note 10.
89 See sources cited supra note 3. The current presumption is that the responding party
pays, but there would be problems for low income litigants if the rule were a blanket rule in
favor of the responding or the requesting party.
90 See FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(3)(B)(ii)–(iii) (allowing the court to order pre-trial
conferences and issue a scheduling order which may “modify the extent of discovery; [and]
provide for disclosure or discovery of electronically stored information[.]”); see also FED.
R. CIV. P. 33 (discussing interrogatories and ESI based business records); FED. R. CIV. P.
34 advisory committee’s note to 2006 amendment (“Rule 34(a) is amended to confirm that
discovery of electronically stored information stands on equal footing with discovery of
paper documents.”); FED. R. CIV. P. 45 advisory committee’s note to 2006 amendment
(“Rule 45 (d)(1)(B) is amended to provide that if the subpoena does not specify the form
or forms for electronically stored information, the person served with the subpoena must
produce electronically stored information in a form or forms in which it is usually
maintained or in a form or forms that are reasonably usable. Rule 45(d)(1)(C) is added to
provide that the person producing electronically stored information should not have to
produce the same information in more than one form unless so ordered by the court for
good cause.”).
91 See FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(3)(B)(ii)–(iii).
92 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2).
93 See
Coleman Holdings, Inc. v. Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc., No.
502003CA005045XXOCAI, 2005 WL 679071 at *6 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Mar. 1, 2005) (holding
that defendant’s “willful disobedience of the Agreed Order justifies sanctions”).
88
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produce ESI, where ESI was lost as a result of “routine, good faith
operation of an electronic information system.”94 This provision provides
little protection, considering the Coleman and Zubulake opinions and their
successors. Attorneys need to ensure that their document retention
programs are fail-safe to avoid spoliation claims and sanctions, which
courts can also impose through their inherent powers. Accordingly, the
rules must indicate the purpose of sanctions in the ESI context.95
The relevance standard under Rule 26 includes a proportionality test
that can limit the scope of discovery at the outset. This test may reduce
costs, but it does not address the issue of cost itself.96 The changed rules
themselves indicate that committees have been trying to regulate the entire
e-discovery process more strictly, but these changes fall short of
demanding binding cost allocations on the parties prior to litigation.97 For
instance, a change to Rule 16 indicates that courts expect attorneys to be
ready for litigation, including being fluent in information technology (IT)

94

FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e).
See George Kanabe & Jacob Heath, A Better Way to Litigate?- The December 1,
2015 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Aim for More Efficiency and
Less Delay, NorCal IP Blog, (March 27, 2016)
http://blogs.orrick.com/norcalip/2015/11/11/a-better-way-to-litigate-the-december-1-2015-amendments-to-the-federalrules-of-civil-procedure-aim-for-more-efficiency-and-less-delay/ (This issue was
addressed in the 2015 amendments: “Rule 37(e), as amended, will provides a uniform
standard for courts to apply when determining how to address lost or missing ESI. If a party
fails to preserve ESI and only upon a finding of prejudice, amended Rule
37(e)(1) authorizes a court to order curative measures “no greater than necessary to cure
the prejudice.” According to the Committee comments, curative measures may include: (a)
forbidding the party that failed to preserve ESI from putting on certain evidence; (b)
permitting the parties to present evidence and argument to the jury regarding the loss of
ESI; or (c) giving jury instructions to assist in its evaluation of such evidence or argument.
Amended Rule 37(e)(2) allows a court to undertake more drastic measures if it finds a party
acted with an intent to deprive another party of the information. Those measures include:
(1) presuming that the lost information was unfavorable to the party; (2) instructing the
jury that it may or must presume the information was unfavorable to the party; or (3)
dismissing the action or entering a default judgment.”).
96 See Overfield, supra note 66; infra note 130 and accompanying text; see also FED.
R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 1983 amendment (“The elements of Rule
26(b)(1)(iii) address the problem of discovery that is disproportionate to the individual
lawsuit as measured by such matters as its nature and complexity, the importance of the
issues at stake in a case seeking damages, the limitations on a financially weak litigant to
withstand extensive opposition to a discovery program or to respond to discovery requests,
and the significance of the substantive issues, as measured in philosophic, social, or
institutional terms. Thus the rule recognizes that many cases in public policy spheres, such
as employment practices, free speech, and other matters, may have importance far beyond
the monetary amount involved. The court must apply the standards in an even-handed
manner that will prevent use of discovery to wage a war of attrition or as a device to coerce
a party, whether financially weak or affluent.”).
97 See Register, supra note 66, at 1105 (noting importance of agreeing on cost
allocation at pre-trial conference).
95
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and network architecture, so that the pretrial conference leads to
agreements on what ESI is discoverable. 98 Rule 26(f)(C)(3) demands that
parties discuss the form of e-discovery to be used. The notes from the
advisory committee suggest there is a trend toward clearer enforcement of
e-discovery agreements and cost allocation pre-trial, as Register has
suggested as an important issue.99 Rule 26(a)(1)(C) addresses the need for
timely initial disclosures, meet and confer rules, protecting third parties
from excessive cost of discovery, and procedures governing disclosure of
privileged or third party privacy protected information.100 The rules
collectively purport to enforce some agreements between parties regarding
e-discovery, early on in the litigation. Amendments to the rules, which
took effect on December 1, 2015, were aimed at limiting the scope of
discovery and requiring parties and the courts to limit over broad
discovery.101 Finally, amendments to the rules adopted in 2015 address
the issues of excess costs and the administration of justice by requiring

98 FED. R. CIV. P. 16 addresses scheduling orders in pretrial conferences. Part (b)(3)(B)
provides that “the scheduling order may . . . provide for disclosure or discovery of
electronically stored information.” FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(3)(B).
99 The advisory committee’s notes to the 2006 amendment demonstrate a move
towards increased supervision of discovery schedules earlier on in the litigation, stating that
“[t]he amendment to Rule 16(b) is designed to alert the court to the possible need to address
the handling of discovery of electronically stored information early in the litigation if such
discovery is expected to occur . . . . An order that includes the parties’ agreement may be
helpful in avoiding delay and excessive cost in discovery. See Manual for Complex
Litigation (4th) §11.446. Rule 16(b)(6) recognizes the propriety of including such
agreements in the court’s order.”). See Register, supra note 66, at 1105.
100 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(C) (requires that parties make initial disclosures no later than
14 days after the Rule 26(f) meet and confer, unless an objection or another time is set by
stipulation or court order. If parties have an objection, they should voice it early on).
101 See George Kanabe & Jacob Heath, A Better Way to Litigate?- The December 1,
2015 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Aim for More Efficiency and
Less Delay, NORCAL IP BLOG, (March 27, 2016)
http://blogs.orrick.com/norcalip/2015/11/11/a-better-way-to-litigate-the-december-1-2015-amendments-to-the-federalrules-of-civil-procedure-aim-for-more-efficiency-and-less-delay/ (“[T]here are also
several amendments affecting the scope of discovery in recognition of the significant costs
that unfettered discovery imposes on modern companies. Amended Rule 26(b)(1) allows
parties to obtain discovery of any non-privileged matter relating to a party’s claim or
defense, so long as the proposed discovery is proportional to the needs of the case.
Amended Rule 26(b)(2) requires courts to limit the frequency or extent of discovery if the
proposed discovery is ‘outside the scope permitted by Rule 26(b)(1).’ Amended Rule
26(c)(1) allows a court to issue a protective order allocating expenses. Amended Rule
26(d) allows parties to serve requests for production 21 days after service of the summons
and complaint, regardless of whether the parties have held their Rule 26(f) conference. To
coincide with the changes to Rule 16(b), amended Rule 26(f) requires parties to discuss the
preservation of ESI and the possibility for agreements under FRE 502 during their
scheduling conference.”).
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parties to implement the rules to “secure the just, speedy and inexpensive
determination of every action and proceeding.”102
Amendments to date have not adequately addressed the high cost of
e-discovery or uncertainty with respect to allocation of discovery costs. It
is evident that further measures are necessary.
V. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
Academics, like the courts, tend to advocate the narrow interpretation
of the cost shifting statute. Register’s 2014 article advocates such an
interpretation.103 Register notes that state statutes have taken varied
approaches to cost shifting in association with copying, with Nevada
allowing for any cost associated with copying, including labor.104 New
Jersey, on the other hand, has limited shifting of costs for copying to the
institution’s usual rate for making copies, or actual costs of films and
photographs.105 On the federal level, the First Circuit decided that it would
only award fifty percent of photocopying costs, stating that these were
only taxable if they were “reasonably necessary to the maintenance of the
action.”106 Using a different type of narrow view, the Tenth Circuit
adopted a local rule that “necessary” copies should be taxed at cost, but
set a specific monetary cap at fifty cents a copy.107 Noting these diverse
examples of the restrictive view of how to tax e-discovery costs, Register
posits that Race Tires takes the correct approach because it is reflective of
traditional coverage of discovery procedures. Race Tires limited cost
shifting to: (i) converting files to easily searchable format; (ii) scanning
documents, excluding costs of collecting and preserving ESI, and
processing and indexing ESI; and (iii) keyword searching of ESI.108
Analogizing e-discovery to traditional discovery questions misses the
central focus of the debate: how to sustain a workable system of cost
recovery given the large sums of money involved. Traditional discovery
102

See FED. R. CIV. P. 1. The rule previously applied only to courts.
See Register, supra note 66, at 1106.
104 See Register, supra note 66, at 1095 (citing NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-712 (3)(b)(iii)
(2000)).
105 N.J. REV. STAT. § 17:16S-1(b)(2) (2013).
106 See Register, supra note 66, at 1095 (citing Summit Tech., Inc. v. Nidek Co., 435
F.3d 1371, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2006)).
107 See Register, supra note 66, at 1096 (citing 10th Cir. R. 39-1).
108 See Register, supra note 66, at 1099 (“The narrow understanding provided by the
court in Race Tires America offers a better alternative because it draws a clear line in the
area of e-discovery. The line drawn is the same as previous versions of § 1920(4). The
change in language for the newest amendment clearly allows e-discovery costs to be
recovered. But only those items that are the electronic version of traditional copying costs
are allowed. By limiting the costs to the narrower definition, the awards given are much
smaller, which is in keeping with the scope and history of the statute itself.”).
103

2016]

Avoiding Surprises in Cost Shifting Decisions

285

simply does not cost as much as e-discovery and cannot provide us with
satisfactory analogies for cost allocation purposes.109 Register also
mentions briefly that parties can always contract to allocate cost.110 Other
legal bodies are imposing a mandatory procedure to ensure that parties will
in fact reach agreement on the cost allocation for e-discovery before
proceeding in the litigation.
Proposals to cap e-discovery costs have emerged recently.111
Mazanec suggested that costs paid by producing parties should be capped
at one-half of the claim in question.112 Mazanec noted that her approach
would foster cooperation and allow parties to pursue litigation without fear
of ending up with a prohibitive discovery bill.113 This fifty-percent
proposition shields producing parties from exploitation, but fails to
account either for the individual nuances of each case or for the costs that
parties are willing to pay.114 Other proposed solutions aim to determine
the cost allocation of discovery at different stages before the end of the
trial.115 Professors Cooter and Rubinfeld suggest shifting costs to the
requesting party once the other party has provided a certain level of
compliance with discovery.116
In a recent Wall Street Journal editorial article, Senator Kyl analyzed
proposed changes to the FRCP, noting that some of the most significant
changes in the package are aimed at reducing the cost and burdens
associated with discovery.117 The three most important committee
proposals are: (i) to provide a clear national standard which limits
sanctions for discarding information that was sought in litigation to
companies which have acted in bad faith; (ii) to provide a “narrower
scope” for discovery, focusing on claims and defenses in each case instead
of allowing discovery of any information that might lead to admissible
evidence; and (iii) to confirm judicial authority under Rule 26(c), which
allows courts to allocate the costs of discovery to the requesting party118
A “requester pays” system would be particularly effective in
109

See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
Register, supra note 66, at 1105 (“Even with a narrow reading of § 1920(4), parties
are able to contract broader costs.”).
111
See, e.g., Karel Mazanec, Capping E-Discovery Costs: A Hybrid Solution to EDiscovery Abuse, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 631, 634 (2014); Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L.
Rubinfeld, An Economic Model of Legal Discovery, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 435, 455–56
(1994).
112 See Mazanec, supra note 111, at 634.
113 See Mazanec, supra note 111, at 634.
114 See Mazanec, supra note 111, at 634.
115 See Cooter & Rubinfeld, supra note 111, at 455–456.
116 See id. at 437.
117 See Kyl, supra note 10.
118 See Kyl, supra note 10.
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accomplishing the goals of reducing costs and precluding overly broad
requests, which have the effect of coercing the other side to settle.119
Senator Kyl also noted that state bodies, such as the New Jersey Civil
Justice Institute, are commenting on the proposed rules in a more favorable
manner. He stated that that there will be a significant reduction in
litigation costs and trial delay if these rules are adopted.120 One way to ensure
that the broader goals of Rules Committee are met would be an addition
to 28 U.S.C. § 1920(4), referencing parties’ ESI pre-trial determinations.
Such an addition would deter punitive litigation techniques by plaintiffs as
they would face clear consequences based on pre-trial conference
decisions or arbitration agreements.121
Other effective solutions include the system used by the Financial
Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), a self-regulatory non-profit
organization that operates under the oversight of the SEC,122 in arbitration
proceedings.
Arbitrators regulate the entire discovery process.123
Arbitrators can impose sanctions, including the shifting of costs for failure
to comply or bad faith efforts to manage document production by the
parties.124 The proposal requesting approval of these procedures indicated
that they would help to limit what was noted as the large increase in
discovery disputes, noting that they “encourage[] the parties to agree to the
voluntary exchange of documents and information and to stipulate to
certain matters.”125 Controlling discovery costs and enforcing party
cooperation throughout the litigation ensures more fairness and leaves no
room for surprise bills of up to millions of dollars.
Several of the approaches discussed above seek to promote
cooperation between the parties through increased regulation of the
119

See Kyl, supra note 10.
See Kyl, supra note 10.
121 Debra Cassens Weiss, Sanctions Will Deter Discovery Abuse, Qualcomm Magistrate
Says, A.B.A.J. (Oct. 15, 2007) (“‘If there isn’t some kind of sanction, there’s no
deterrence,’ [U.S. Magistrate Judge Barbara Major] said. ‘How can this possibly be
tolerated in the age of digital evidence?’”).
122 See Order Approving FINRA Proposed Rule Change Creating NASD Discovery
Guide, 64 Fed. Reg. 49256 (Sept. 10, 1999) (approving use of arbitration procedures during
discovery in customer cases). The National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) was
merged into FINRA in 2007. See SEC Historical Society, The Institution of Experience:
Self-Regulatory Organizations in the Securities Industry, 1792-2010, Creation of FINRA
http://www.sechistorical.org/museum/galleries/sro/sro06g.php.
123 See generally FINRA, DISCOVERY GUIDE, http://www.finra.org/sites/default
/files/ArbMed/p394527.pdf (last visited March 23, 2016).
124 See generally FINRA R. 12511, Discovery Sanctions (providing for sanctions for
non-cooperation in discovery under FINRA R. 12212); FINRA R. 12212 (specifying
sanctions, including “assessing attorney’s fees, costs and expenses”).
125 FINRA Rule Change Creating NASD Discovery Guide, 64 Fed. Reg. 20036, 20036
(proposed April 23, 1999).
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discovery process throughout the litigation. What is missing is a link
between such cooperation and the eventual imposition of costs. As
discussed in Section VI, the rules governing discovery and cost allocation
at both the beginning and end of litigation can provide such a link. The
amended rules should both require that parties decide on a very
specifically delineated cost allocation and discovery schedule and reward
those who cooperate during the proceedings by not imposing unexpected
costs afterwards. This approach does not eliminate the possibility of cost
shifting, but instead recommends keeping the process under strict control
by requiring the parties to agree on the basis and amount of costs to be
shifted and enforcing that agreement through court orders.
VI. RECOMMENDED SOLUTIONS
A streamlined approach under the U.S.C. cost shifting statute from
the outset of litigation to the post-litigation stage, with amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) governing e-discovery, would
facilitate e-discovery while enforcing a workable scheme of cost-shifting.
A re-worked set of rules requiring an enhanced discovery schedule and
cost agreements would increase efficiency and create uniformity across the
state and district court systems. Alongside this new set of rules should be
guidelines and detailed explanations for attorneys of the rules governing
e-discovery and suggested methods for managing discovery. One such
method might be a multi-stage approach to arriving at a discovery
schedule, perhaps beginning with samples of discoverable data from each
set of electronically stored data sought for analysis.
Furthermore, the new approach should include increased use of
agreements that are binding on the parties, as they are in arbitration
procedures required by FINRA during discovery. Alternatively, there
could be a judicially managed process such as a stipulation so ordered. A
binding agreement created between the parties as a pre-requisite to
beginning the litigation process could then govern cost-shifting at the postlitigation stage, given an appropriately amended rule under U.S.C.
§ 1920(4). This would obviate the need for a specified list of what can be
considered “copying” or “exemplifying.” Relying on definitions in
statutes may lead to indefinitely divergent results despite a list, as judicial
understanding of emerging technologies varies and there is ongoing need
to update the list.126 The rule change would place the responsibility for
126 See e.g., Jason B. Bonk, Reasonableness and Proportionality Win Another Fight for
Predictive Coding, (Sept. 17, 2014), E-DISCOVERY L. REV. (Sept. 17, 2014), available
at http://www.ediscoverylawreview.com (follow “September 2014” hyperlink) (quoting
Bridgestone Ams., Inc. v. IBM, No. 3:13-1196, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142525 (M.D.
Tenn. July 22, 2014) (indicating that even where judges do understand the complexities of
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cost-shifting on the shoulders of the parties, leaving the role of the
judiciary to be one of enforcement of parties’ agreements, rather than one
of individual courts’ interpretations of a long list of technical terminology.
To remove doubt as to cost allocations for e-discovery, these changes
to U.S.C. § 1920(4) would be echoed at the beginning of litigation with
changes to the FRCP setting up the ultimate outcome of the potential cost
shifting. Specifically, FRCP 26(f)(3)(C) should be amended to make
parties’ agreements binding as to what forms the e-discovery should
take.127 Similarly, parties should also be required to agree on
preservation of ESI, and that agreement should specify what to do when
privileged or third party private information is inadvertently produced.128
The current reference in FRCP 26(f)(2)(1) to preservation of information
requirements is simply inadequate for the purposes of e-discovery.129
With the changes suggested here, the reward for abiding by the
discovery schedule, keeping effective preservation plans in place,
providing broad access where it is relevant to the litigation, and keeping
the scope of non-required discovery to a minimum, would be generous
cost shifting reflecting the terms of the demand stage agreement.130 These
ideas are in keeping with the requirement imposed by the rules that parties
must sign all disclosures, requests, responses and objections with costs in
mind.131

technology, there will always be room for judicial discretion as to which technology should
be used; the Bridgestone court issued a discovery order which allowed the use of predictive
coding to narrow a document set that had been searched using keywords, while noting that
“[t]here is no single, simple, correct solution possible under these circumstances”).
127 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f)(3)(C).
128 FED. R. CIV. P. 26 (f)(3)(D) (“A discovery plan must state the parties’ views and
proposals on: . . . any issues about claims of privilege or protection as trial preparation
materials, including-if the parties agree on a procedure to assert these claims after
production-whether the court to include their agreement in an order.”) (emphasis added).
129 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f)(2) (“In conferring, the parties must consider the nature and
basis of their claims and defenses and possibilities for promptly settling or resolving the
case . . . [;] discuss any issues about preserving discoverable information; and develop a
proposed discovery plan.”).
130 FED. R. CIV. P. 26. The current scope of discovery is general and broad, but the
“relevance” standard of Rule 26(b)(1) is limited to some extent by the consideration of costs
to the parties. Rule 26 (b)(2)(C) expresses these limits: “[T]he court must limit the
frequency or extent of discovery . . . if it determines that: (i) the discovery sought is
unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or can be obtained from some other source that is
more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive; . . . (iii) the proposed discovery is
outside the scope permitted by Rule 26(b)(1).” Id. (emphasis added).
131 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g)(1)(B)(3). Attorney certification under Rule 26 (g) (1) (B) (3) is
required to indicate “with respect to a discovery request, response or objection it is: . . . (iii)
neither unreasonable nor unduly burdensome or expensive, considering the needs of the
case, prior discovery in the case, the amount in controversy and the issues at stake in the
action.” Id.
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The suggestions of the Rules Committee and FINRA’s arbitration
procedures contain important lessons. The mandatory arbitration clauses
recommended in the e-discovery context also grant maximum flexibility
to the parties without jeopardizing the prospect of just litigation. Clear
FRCP rules reflecting the final taxation of costs under U.S.C. § 1920(4)
would allow parties to pursue lawsuits in federal court without the fear that
discovery will be stymied by concerns about paying for the necessary
information. This change would lead to predictability and fairness,
provided that justification for the requested material is clearly stated at the
outset and that parties agree to cost allocations. It would also create
uniformity across the circuit courts and affect how federal district courts
and state courts handle ESI discovery requests and cost allocations.
Some district courts have responded to requests for cost shifting by
finding against the litigants on the basis of inaction and bad faith in failure
to address the issue of discovery costs at the demand stage. The Eastern
District of Michigan held in 2008 that there would be no cost shifting in
Cason-Merenda v. Detroit Med. Ctr.132 In Cason-Merenda, the defendant
did not identify ESI under FRCP 26(b)(2)(B) as “not reasonably
accessible” or file a motion for an order protecting it from burden or cost,
but instead produced responsive ESI and then sought an order imposing
half of its own costs on plaintiffs.133 The court denied the motion as both
untimely, because the defendant had not raised the issue before incurring
the costs, and inappropriate because the defendant conceded that the ESI
was accessible, precluding any issue of good cause under FRCP
26(b)(2)(C).134 Similarly, in a decision later affirmed by the Federal
Circuit, CBT Flint Partner, LLC v. Return Path, Inc., the district court
judge shifted discovery fees to the requesting party where the defendants
complied with overbroad demands and the plaintiff lacked both early
planning and good faith.135 The solution proposed here would guide
parties away from incurring costs in the hope of post-litigation relief; most
132 Cason-Merenda v. Detroit Med. Ctr., No. CIV.A. 06-15601, 2008 WL 2714239, (E.D.
Mich. July 7, 2008).
133 See id. at *1–3.
134 See id. at *3–4.
135 CBT Flint Partner, LLC v. Return Path, Inc, No. 1:07-CV-1822-TWT, 2008 WL
4441920, *2-4 (N.D. Ga. August 7, 2008) (holding that a combination of bad faith and lack
of early planning in the case to fairly share the enormous expense incurred in producing
vast quantities of data formed the basis of the decision to shift the majority of the costs onto
the requesting party. The court noted “the extraordinary demands made by the Plaintiff upon
Cisco for document production, the costs incurred to date by Cisco, and the Plaintiff’s
failure to demonstrate that the relevance and importance to the case of the documents are
proportional to the cost required for their production.” The court further ruled that the
defendant was entitled under Rule 37(a)(5) to an additional $86,787 which was 75% of its
discovery cost.) aff’d, 501 Fed. Appx. 980 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
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parties would agree on cost allocation in advance, and the court would
simply enforce that agreement.
CONCLUSION
The narrow interpretation on the part of some circuit courts of the
words “copying” and “exemplifications” in 28 U.S.C. § 1920(4), which
has led to their refusal to shift costs for production of ESI material, will
lead to increasingly unequal litigation.136 Parties that face potentially
crippling ESI costs will be deterred from bringing a lawsuit or going to
trial. Uncertainty about post-litigation cost allocations broadens this
effect to include many of those who would have recovered their costs.
The two recently proposed solutions, that is, advocating a “narrow”
interpretation of the statute or a rule change requiring the requesting party
to pay all discovery costs, do not address these problems, especially for
cases where an enormous volume of data must be sifted through.137 The
current status quo is not likely to prevent e-discovery abuses either. But if
there are clear rules at the outset of the trial, and at the end of trial, then
the parties can resolve question of cost shifting in a court-supervised pretrial conference process, and the court can simply impose the logical
consequences of their agreement post-litigation. Without a solid set of
effective practice and procedural rules in place, however, the question of
who bears the burden of e-discovery costs may become the deciding factor
in the litigation outcome. That result will never be a satisfactory one for
the American justice system.138

136

2012).

See, e.g., Race Tires Am., Inc. v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp., 674 F.3d 158 (3d Cir.

137 See supra note 10 and accompanying text (noting that costs of e-discovery lead to
decisions to settle regardless of the merits of the case); see also Junk & McNulty, supra
note 25, at *1 (“Skyrocketing discovery costs offend the very premise of the civil justice
system, which is ‘to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action
and proceeding.’”).
138 See American Association for Justice, supra note 11 (noting that all Americans
deserve access to the courts to “hold wrongdoers accountable”).

